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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN PRESCRIBING
SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET HARASSMENT OF
WEST BERLIN.

82911

WORKING DRAFT #4
July 30, 1952TOP SECRET
Security InformationPSB D-21
Supplement 1

SECTION I

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

ASSUMPTIONS:

That West Berlin's situation will continue substantially as set forth below (with the possible variations indicated):

1. Circumstances:

A. West Berlin's situation. That West Berlin will continue to be:

(1) useful as a unique base behind the Iron Curtain for propaganda, intelligence and other activities;

(2) vulnerable to, and subjected to, Soviet and East-German pressures of varying types and severity, particularly a drawn-out campaign of encroachments and harassments, a "creeping blockade" or varying and alternating pressures, which would have dangerous attritional effects on the city's economic viability and morale, as well as discouraging and divisive effects on the three Allied Powers in the city and the German Federal Republic;

(3) subject to internal political and other developments, including inter- and intra-party discord, some labor unrest, occasional impatience, and resentment toward the Federal Republic and Western Allies in the city, all aggravated by uncertainty and irritability;

(4) in need of continued subsidization of its economy and moral support by the Western Allies, including the Federal Republic;

(5) required by circumstances to have a special status, separate from the Federal Republic, and denied the degree of self-government which the Federal Republic is to have under the Contractual Agreements. (Despite this, de facto ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic will be strengthened and West Berlin will in practice be given considerable autonomy.)

B. Soviet Objectives and Methods. To the extent that they can be

TOP SECRET
Security Information

Page 2 of 11 pages

ascertained or presumed, Soviet aims and courses of action vis-a-vis West Berlin do not lend themselves to simple formulation, and it is probable that they are subject to change at any time. It is assumed that:

(1) The Soviet optimum aim is to make Berlin the capital of a reunited, Soviet-dominated Germany as a step forward in strengthening the Soviet sphere and in the drive for control over the rest of Western Europe and beyond.

(2) The Soviet minimum aim is, in brief, to Sovietize Eastern Germany and mobilize its potential to achieve Soviet ends.

SECTION II

OBJECTIVES OF UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

The principal objectives of United States psychological strategy in relation to West Berlin are:

1. To maintain and strengthen free West Berlin, the Western position, and Allied resolve to support and protect it.
 - a. To stimulate in the free world acceptance and support of the burden, risks, and consequences involved in the maintenance of West Berlin, including reprisals, possible ultimatums, and the possible use of force which a grave threat to our West Berlin position might make necessary.
 - b. To deter Soviet and satellite actions against West Berlin.
 - c. To expose the aggressive nature of Soviet and satellite action, and make clear the defensive nature and peaceful purposes of Allied measures.
 - d. To buttress West Berlin's morale.
2. To maintain and increase to the fullest the value of West Berlin as a base of operations, as a symbol of Western strength, and as a symbol of future German reunification under freedom.
 - a. To turn Soviet actions against West Berlin, where possible, to advantage by using their impact to develop Western strength and unity to a degree not otherwise possible.
 - b. To continue to extract maximum value from West Berlin as a rallying point for Allied determination, a center of joint efforts, a source of experience and moral strength, and a clearing-house for Allied initiative, interests and policies at the tactical level.
3. To coordinate Allied plans and activities in the psychological field in relation to Berlin to the maximum extent feasible and advisable.

SECTION III


SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION

NOTE ON TASKS: The Tasks of this Plan are inherent in the Objectives stated in the preceding SECTION, and are implied in the Actions below.

1. Maintain and strengthen West Berlin, the Western position, and Allied resolve to support and protect it.

A. Stimulate in the free world acceptance and support of the burden, risks and consequences involved in the maintenance of West Berlin, including reprisals, possible ultimatums, and the possible use of force which a grave threat to our West Berlin position might make necessary.

(1) Utilize all available media to support diplomatic and other political actions intended to foster continued interest in, and a sense of responsibility for, West Berlin, in order to promote governmental and other (including private commercial) actions, and public support of such actions, in the Allied countries (including the Federal Republic), resulting in continued and increased economic aid to West Berlin, a further development of West Berlin's own economic strength, and improvement of West Berlin's staying power and defensive ability.



(2) Prepare the ground psychologically, through all available media, for public acceptance and support, in West Berlin, the Federal Republic, and the Allied nations, of the risks involved in any actions (including reprisals, possible ultimatums, and the use of force), which a serious aggravation of the Berlin situation might make necessary. (This requires the most subtle approach as well as means and methods appropriate to the differing and changing psychological

TOP SECRET

climates in each nation as a whole and in the regional, class, political and other sub-groups of the several countries. The risk of producing undesired results, even diametrically opposed to those intended, may make preferable no effort at all along these lines in some areas.)

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B. To deter Soviet and satellite actions against West Berlin.

- 1) Persuade the Soviets that they will be held responsible by the Western Allies for any action taken against West Berlin.

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- (2) Demonstrate Soviet and (where applicable) East German responsibility for action against West Berlin, through all available media;
 - (a) the futility of their action in the light of Western determination and demonstrated ability to hold out;
 - (b) the self-defeating effects of their action in strengthening Western unity and preparedness (which such actions as joint countermeasures, strong public reaction, and partial mobilization would emphasize effectively); and
 - (c) the cumulative and incalculable risks which the resulting situation of tension must produce, and which the West is ready to see through to their ultimate logical conclusion, if necessary.

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- (3) Promote, through all available means, East Berlin and East German sympathy for West Berlin's plight, and foster the translation of such a reaction into both positive and passive actions, such as slowdowns, economic harassments, etc.

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- (4) Stimulate popular action throughout the free world against Soviet, satellite and local communist personalities, trade, transport, communications and publications. (Free trade union and social democrat protests and action would be particularly valuable in discrediting the Soviet Union as a "paradise of the workers", in counteracting communist inroads into local labor ranks, in exposing "Fifth Columnists" and front organizations, and in general humiliating and annoying the Soviet Union and its subsidiaries abroad);

- (5) Use all available media to make Berliners aware of the dangerous implications of provocative incidents.

Action: STATE/CIA

- C. Through all available media expose Soviet encroachments against West Berlin as aggressive, and reveal Allied actions as defensive and Allied motives as peaceful.

Action: STATE

Support: CIA

- D. Buttress West Berlin's morale.

- (1) Assure West Berlin of the continuous support of the free world through varied use of informational media, important visitors, international conventions in West Berlin, awards, and other distinctions to the city and its citizens.

Action: STATE

Support: CIA

TOP SECRET


- (2) Publicize Allied and Federal Republic aid and readiness to act in defense of the city by informing the population of the aid rendered, and protective measures taken, in their behalf, their own considerable achievements in restoring and maintaining their city, and their role as "front line" citizens of the free world.

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- (3) Utilize every opportunity to explain that the continuation of West Berlin's special status is necessary in order to preserve the Allied right to remain in West Berlin and maintain its freedom.

25X1C


- (4) Encourage the placing of orders by governments and large firms, publicize West Berlin's ability to deliver, and stimulate a "Buy Berlin" drive in business circles, informational media, and through civic groups.

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2. A. Turn Soviet actions against West Berlin, where possible, to advantage by using their impact to develop Western strength and unity to a degree not otherwise possible.

- (1) Use West Berlin's predicament as a means of persuading prompt action on the Contractual and EDC Agreements, stressing that communist pressures against West Berlin demonstrate the insincerity of the Soviet unity campaign.

Action: STATE

Support: CIA

- (2) Exploit each serious Berlin crisis to develop Western strength and unity by taking or accelerating preparedness

measures, including partial or full mobilization of manpower, industry, and resources in the free nations, developing and implementing Allied joint economic and military plans, and stimulating through all possible means popular support for such measures.

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[REDACTED]

- (3) If war does break out as a result of events in Berlin, maximize in the public mind West Berlin's symbolic character, the offensive nature of communist action, and the tragedy of Allied and German losses, in order to mobilize world opinion for a fight to the finish.

25X1C
[REDACTED]

B. Continue to extract maximum value from Berlin as a rallying point for Allied determination, a center of joint efforts, a source of experience, and a clearing-house for Allied initiative, interests and policies at the tactical level.

- (1) Exploit to the fullest, through all available media, West Berlin's situation as evidence of Western strength, unity, determination and good faith, and as a demonstration of the principle of collective security in action in an extreme and dramatic situation; also exploit to the fullest, through all possible media, West Berlin's role as a living promise of future German reunification under freedom, by such actions as beginning a program of city planning and reconstruction publicized widely as the rebuilding of Berlin—traditional and future capital of a free and reunified Germany, in order to reassure and inspire the people of the city and of the Federal Republic

25X1C
[REDACTED]

- (2) Communicate to other areas some of the usual resilience, courage, optimism, and anti-totalitarianism of the people of Berlin and their leaders by such actions as: (a) stimulating visits by articulate Berliners to the Federal Republic and other areas where they can inculcate some of their own "front line" spirit; (b) stimulating visits by influential West Germans and other persons of the free world visits by influential West Germans to Berlin; and (c) distributing to other areas of information materials, particularly in the visual media (films and television films) demonstrating West Berlin's courage and defiance of Soviet impingements. (NOTE: The HIOOG film "Friend of the Worker" is a prime example).

ACTION: STATE

- (3) Coordinate Allied plans and activities in the psychological field in relation to the maximum extent feasible and advisable. Establish closest possible liaison and coordination of efforts in the field of psychological strategy in relation to the Berlin situation, so that where advisable and feasible, Allied efforts can be directed toward common objectives and avoid working at cross purposes; this should include participation, to an increasing extent, of the competent authorities of the West Berlin and Bonn Governments.

Action: STATE

SECTION IV

SUGGESTED ACTIONS

The following list illustrates additional types of actions which should be reviewed for possible use if and as the Berlin situation warrants.

1. Prepare, for publication when advisable, a German White Paper designed to show the essentially defensive nature of Allied actions with respect to Berlin, and the essentially unwarranted, hostile, and aggressive nature of the actions of the U.S.S.R.

Action: STATE

2. Promote the organization of a West Berlin "Emergency Council" consisting of political, social, and economic leaders (including the SPD) from the Federal Republic, to sit with the West Berlin Government for the conduct of siege operations.

Action: STATE/DEFENSE

3. With Government support, take such actions as necessary to guarantee adequate living and business conditions in West Berlin under blockade such as stimulating, if necessary by subsidy, low-cost travel to and from Berlin, etc.

Action: STATE/MSA

4. Stimulate the extension of credit from international and other Western European financial institutions to government, business, and individuals where warranted to support operations in West Berlin under blockade conditions.

Action: STATE/MSA

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
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